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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CECELIA BEA SCAFIDE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
-vs- Lower Court Civil No. 914903785DA 
Case No. 930276-CA 
JAMES WAYNE SCAFIDE, Priority Classification 15 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLANT (hereinafter "defendant" or "husband") submits the 
following as his reply brief in support of his appeal in the above-
referenced action: 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES. STATUTES and RULES 
Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, may be 
determinative of the outcome in this appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The parties to this action apparently agree that the standard 
of review is for an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
court. Birch v. Birch, 771 P. 2d 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1989; 
appellee's brief, at pp 1 and 2). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
set aside the decree of divorce and judgment entered against the 
defendant/appellant. The trial court's failure to set aside the 
decree of divorce and judgment was an abuse of discretion for the 
following reasons: 
a. the defendant had not been represented at any prior 
stage in the proceedings by independent counsel; and 
b. there was substantial evidence on file at the time 
the decree of divorce was entered that the defendant was not 
competent to stipulate to a decree of divorce in his own 
behalf; and 
c. there was substantial evidence before the trial 
court in support of the defendant's motion for relief from 
judgment to the effect that the plaintiff had perpetrated a 
fraud against the defendant by assuring him that the divorce 
was merely a sham, to protect the parties' assets from 
contingent liabilities created by a driving incident in which 
the defendant had been involved, and that the plaintiff 
continued to treat the defendant as her husband until over six 
months after the entry of the decree of divorce. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT ENTERED 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. 
The procedural facts in this case are not substantially in 
dispute. The parties signed a stipulation, the plaintiff being 
represented by counsel and the defendant acting pro se. The trial 
court waived the ninety-day waiting period and permitted a decree 
of divorce to be granted on December 3, 1991. The trial court 
waived the initial ninety-day waiting period to permit entry of the 
decree of divorce, based upon two letters from the defendant's 
health care providers. Subsequently, on July 30, 1992, the 
defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT I. DEFENDANT SUFFERED FROM A MENTAL 
ILLNESS SUCH THAT A DEFAULT WAS 
IMPROPER. 
In her brief, the plaintiff takes exception with the 
description that the defendant suffered from a mental illness or 
defect at the time of the entry of the decree of divorce. However, 
plaintiff's argument wholly ignores the fact that the defendant had 
been awarded Social Security disability benefits prior to the entry 
of the decree, and that the Social Security Administration had 
required that a conservator be appointed, not the plaintifff to 
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administer the funds received from the Social Security 
Administration. It flies in the face of logic to assume that the 
Social Security Administration would award benefits, and then 
require that a representative payee receive the benefits in behalf 
of the defendant, if defendant were deemed capable of managing his 
own affairs. 
Further, the health care providers for the defendant filed 
reports with the trial court, to support a waiver of the initial 
ninety-day waiting period, describing very alarming conduct on the 
part of the defendant. The letter from the medical doctor 
describes the defendant as "an admitted alcoholic who now drinks 
one pint of liquor per day according to his account. He has 
exhibited erratic and aggressive behavior in the recent past. He 
has damaged his hands from punching walls in the recent past in 
testimony to this behavior." The letter from Rick Hansen, a 
physician's assistant, also describes Mr. Scafide as drinking 
excessively, and refers Mr. Scafide for mental health counseling 
for treatment. All of these descriptions are of an individual who 
may very well not be competent to act in his own behalf, on the 
face of the documents. (These medical reports are included as part 
of the appendix hereto.) 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside 
a decree of divorce entered in the face of this kind of evidence 
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about the defendant's health and mental state at the time of entry 
of the decree. 
Plaintiff alleges in her brief that there were "no 
manifestations of alarm or concern . . . raised about the 
defendant's assertion to his health care providers that his divorce 
was uncontested." An uncontested divorce is a far cry from a 
divorce in which an individual is not represented by any legal 
counsel. Moreover, it is not the duty of health care providers to 
know or understand the law or the legal system, or to provide legal 
advice to their patients. It would be unusual, rather than the 
norm, for a health care provider to interject a legal opinion in a 
legal proceeding. 
Plaintiff asserts that the defendant's representation of 
himself at a trial arising from a DUI arrest in Moab, Utah, 
subsequent to the decree of divorce, is evidence of his competency. 
What plaintiff has failed to relate to the Court is that the 
defendant's representation of himself in that criminal matter 
resulted in a finding of guilty and substantial penalties, and was 
probably very ill-advised. 
POINT II. THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO 
SUPPORT A FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF 
PERPETRATED A FRAUD UPON DEFENDANT 
AND THE COURT. 
Plaintiff, both in the trial court and in her appellate brief, 
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strenuously denies that she engaged in any scheme to defraud 
defendant to persuade him to sign a stipulation for an uncontested 
divorce. She contended in the trial court and contends to this 
court that she and the defendant have led "separate lives" for a 
significant period of time, and that they did not continue to act 
as husband and wife after entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
In support of her position, the plaintiff has submitted to the 
trial court an addendum containing her trial court affidavit in 
opposition to her motion for summary judgment. To this she has 
attached only the last page of the parties' lease with the landlord 
in Colorado, showing that the plaintiff signed the lease. She has 
failed to attach the front page of the lease because it would 
reflect that the lease was held in the names of both parties. The 
entire lease agreement, together with the "pet rider" signed by 
both parties, is attached to the defendant's affidavits in the 
trial court and is a part of the court record. It shows that 
plaintiff and defendant had housing together months after the 
decree. 
Though she contends that the defendant and she did not live 
together as husband and wife, plaintiff, in her own brief, admits 
the following: 
a. that the parties both moved to Colorado immediately 
after the decree of divorce. (Plaintiff's brief at page 6); 
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and 
b. that the plaintiff's name appeared upon the lease 
agreement for residential property leased in the names of both 
parties after the entry of the decree of divorce. 
(Plaintiff's brief at page 7); and 
c. that the defendant purchased real estate in Colorado 
after the entry of the decree of divorce herein, and then 
conveyed title from himself to both of these parties as joint 
tenants with full rights of survivorship (plaintiff's brief at 
page 6); and 
d. that the defendant continued to be listed as 
plaintiff's husband and as an insured party on her medical 
insurance after the decree of divorce (though defendant claims 
she notified her employer that she was divorced) . 
(Plaintiff's brief at page 6); and 
e. that the parties had joint bank accounts which 
continued to be held in the names of both parties after the 
entry of the decree of divorce. (Plaintiff does not admit, 
apparently, that she continued to use both joint accounts. 
However, she wrote a check on the "defendant's" joint account 
months after the decree of divorce was entered.) A copy of 
this check was submitted to the trial court as an attachment 
to plaintiff's affidavits, and is a part of the addendum to 
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this brief. 
It is totally illogical for the plaintiff to assert that the 
defendant is lying about the representations made to him regarding 
the divorce and the nature of the parties7 relationship after the 
divorce, in the face of all the independent evidence about the 
plaintiff's actual conduct after the decree, in allowing defendant 
to interact with her substantially as a spouse would. 
Plaintiff makes much of the fact that she has brought an 
action for a restraining order against the defendant in the state 
of Colorado. It should be noted that all of these Colorado 
restraining order actions were commenced after June 1993, when 
defendant was advised for the first time that the plaintiff 
actually intended to be divorced from him, and to separate from 
him. There was no indication of any altercation between these 
parties until the "true divorce" occurred, exactly as the defendant 
says it did, in the summer of 1993 and not in 1992. 
POINT III. THE DEFENDANTS MOTION 
IS NOT TIME BARRED. 
It is true that most of the basies for relief from a judgment 
under Rule 60(b) require that motions be filed within ninety days 
of the date of entry of the decree. However, Rule 60(b) clearly 
authorizes a court to relieve a party from a judgment, in the 
interests of justice, beyond a three month waiting period. In the 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Scafide v, Scafide, Lower Court Case No. 914903785DA 
Appeals Court Case No. 930276CA 
Greetings: 
This letter is in regard to the appellant's reply brief in the 
above-referenced matter filed with the Utah Court of Appeals on 
April 29, 1994. 
On page 8 of the reply brief, in the last line before Point 
II., the language should be: "in the summer of 1992 and not in 
1991." On page 9, the last line of second paragraph, the date 
should read "July 1992," not July 1993. 
Thank you. 
Sincerely, 
MCC:keg 
cc: Jim Scafide 
:ORPORON 
instant case, the plaintiff is alleged to have perpetrated a fraud 
as follows: she concocted an explanation for wanting a divorce, 
other than a desire to terminate her relationship with the 
defendant; she obtained defendant's stipulation to a "sham" 
divorce; she knew defendant had a mental or emotional illness; she 
strung the defendant along for six months after the entry of the 
decree of divorce, acting as though she intended to continue with 
their relationship as husband and wife; and finally, she terminated 
the relationship by obtaining a restraining order in Colorado, and 
eventually married a third party (whom she had previously known in 
Utah) in Colorado in July 1993. 
Defendant acknowledges that there is a need for finality of 
judgments. However, it is not in the interests of justice to 
permit someone to perpetrate a fraud upon an opposing party, to 
prevent them from filing a motion for relief from judgment or 
taking action to defend themselves for three months, and then to 
leave the aggrieved party without any legal remedy. 
Plaintiff, in her brief, asserts that defendant's case is 
merely a situation of "sour grapes" and dissatisfaction with an 
earlier stipulation. In support of her case, plaintiff cites the 
decision in Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Company, 817 P. 2d 382 
(Ut. App. 1991). In that case, Chipman argued that he had 
mistakenly entered into an ill-advised stipulation without fully 
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understanding its consequences. The court applied the three month 
time limit in which to bring an action under Rule 60(b). These 
facts are not consistent with and are highly distinguishable from 
the facts in the case now at bar. In the instant case, not only 
does the defendant claim that he entered into an ill-advised 
stipulation without fully understanding its consequences, but the 
defendant claims that he was mentally ill and/or impaired at the 
time of the stipulation. This is a fact not present in the Chipman 
case. Further, defendant contends here that the plaintiff 
affirmatively made an attempt to defraud defendant, to avoid his 
bringing an action to set aside the decree until after his time 
limits had long passed. Again, this is a factor not present in the 
Chipman case. 
Plaintiff takes exception with the defendant's assertion that 
Utah law specifically recognizes that a party's fraud upon the 
court in obtaining judgment may constitute a unique set of 
circumstances under which the court may need to consider the 
party's conduct outside the time limits of Rule 60(b). Plaintiff 
takes exception to this, but wholly ignores the language of Rule 
60(b) contained in the last section of that paragraph, which reads 
as follows: 
. . . This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
proceeding or to set aside a judgment for 
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fraud upon the court. . . . 
This section of Rule 60(b) must be given independent interpretation 
and meaning by the Court. It simply cannot be identical to the 
provisions of Rule 60(b)(1) through Rule 60(b)(7), or there would 
be no point in including this sentence as a separate portion of the 
Rule. When Rule 60(b) states that the Rule "does not limit" the 
power of a court, it must mean that the time limits set forth in 
the preceding portion of the paragraph are not necessarily 
applicable in the case of fraud. That should be the interpretation 
of this Court, and the application of the Rule to the facts of this 
particular case. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held, in a case substantially 
similar to the facts of the instant case, that it was an abuse of 
discretion for a trial court to fail to set aside a decree of 
divorce. In Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P. 2d 928 (Ut. 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered a fact situation wherein a decree of 
divorce was entered pursuant to a stipulation and a motion for 
relief from judgment was subsequently filed. In her motion for 
relief from judgment, the plaintiff in the Boyce action averred 
that she had stipulated to a decree of divorce, on the basis of 
information supplied to her by her former husband, that her husband 
had been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation and misconduct in 
relation to the divorce action, and that she was entitled to relief 
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from judgment. The trial court there denied the motion to set 
aside the decree of divorce. The Utah Supreme Court reversed on 
appeal, finding that the trial court had abused its discretion in 
refusing to grant the wife's motion. The court found as follows: 
A liberal standard for application of 
Rule 60(b) in divorce cases is justified by 
the doctrine of the continuing jurisdiction 
that a court has over its decrees. Clearly, a 
court should modify a prior decree when the 
interests of equity and fair dealing with the 
court and the opposing party so require. 
Although the trial court displayed great 
patience in dealing with this case, we cannot 
avoid the conclusion, on the basis of the 
contentions before this Court, that an 
injustice may have been perpetrated by 
defendant's actions. . . . 
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of 
plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion and remanded for reconsideration of 
the issues of property settlement, alimony and child support. 
The Boyce decision is the case from this jurisdiction most 
like the facts presently before this Court. This Court is 
compelled by the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Boyce, and 
by the requirements of justice and equity, to set aside the 
judgment and decree entered against defendant. 
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Defendant/appellant respectfully requests this Court to order 
the plaintiff to pay the costs and actual attorney's fees incurred 
herein. The plaintiff has attempted to take advantage of 
defendant's mental state, and to defraud him. Defendant has been 
required to expend a considerable amount of time, energy and effort 
to defend himself in this action, and plaintiff should be ordered 
to pay defendant's expenses. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant 
defendant relief from the decree of divorce pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The lower court abused its 
discretion in the face of defendant's pro se status, his alcoholism 
and mental condition which were of record before the court, and the 
allegations of fraud set out in his affidavits in support of his 
motion for relief from judgment. 
The defendant respectfully urges this Court to apply the 
decision in Boyce
 f supra, and to remand this matter for trial upon 
issues of property distribution, debt distribution, alimony and 
child support in the trial court. Further, defendant requests an 
award of attorney's fees for this appeal. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of April, 1994 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am employed in the offices of Corporon 
& Williams, attorneys for the defendant herein, and that I caused 
the foregoing REPLY BRIEF to be served upon plaintiff by mailing 
two true and correct copy of the same in an envelope, postage pre-
paid, and addressed to: 
CAROLYN DRISCOLL 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
8 East Broadway, #735 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on the day of , 1994. 
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October 2, 1991 
James Scafide 
FHP# 31-22-42-1 
To Whom It May Concern: 
James Scafide was in 9-9-91 for a complete history and 
physical with me. During this time he did relate, to me 
a history of alcohol abuse. He stated that he drinks 3 
to 4 pints of liquor per week in order to obliterate 
the pain he suffers from a work injury, sustained March 
of 1987. Mr. Scafide states he has been drinking this 
way for 3 to 4 years now. I have suggested to Mr. 
Scafide mental health counseling for treatment. 
Mr. Scafide has signed a consent for release of this 
information to his wife and her attorney for the 
purpose of expediting their divorce. 
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